Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of Selection? by Gayon, Jean
Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of
Selection?
Jean Gayon
To cite this version:
Jean Gayon. Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of Selection?. Biological Theory,




Submitted on 8 Feb 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de























Your article is protected by copyright and
all rights are held exclusively by Konrad
Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognitive
Research. This e-offprint is for personal
use only and shall not be self-archived in
electronic repositories. If you wish to self-
archive your work, please use the accepted
author’s version for posting to your own
website or your institution’s repository. You
may further deposit the accepted author’s
version on a funder’s repository at a funder’s
request, provided it is not made publicly
available until 12 months after publication.
THEMATIC ISSUE ARTICLE: HOW EVOLUTIONARY IS EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS?
Economic Natural Selection: What Concept of Selection?
Jean Gayon
Received: 4 October 2011 / Accepted: 13 March 2012 / Published online: 6 November 2012
 Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research 2012
Abstract The article examines two cases of adoption of
evolutionary ways of thinking by modern economists:
Nelson and Winter’s (Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, 1982), and evolutionary game theory (1990s and
after). In both cases, the authors explicitly refer to natural
selection in an economic context. I show that natural
selection is taken in two different senses, which correspond
to two general conceptions of the principle of natural
selection, one of which contains reproduction and heredity
as key elements, whereas the other does not.
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Since Darwin, and even before, an impressive list of con-
cepts and models has been exchanged in both directions
between economics and evolutionary theory. In the present
article, I dwell upon two modern cases of adoption of
evolutionary ways of thinking by economists: one is Nel-
son and Winter’s Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change (1982), which introduced the notion of ‘‘economic
natural selection’’; the other and more recent case is evo-
lutionary game theory (EGT henceforth) applied to the
solution of some particular economic problems. In both
cases, natural selection is understood in the sense of the
genetic theory of natural selection, and is invoked in the
context of microeconomics (i.e., the part of economics that
considers the decisions made at a low level, e.g., individ-
uals or firms).
In order to assess what is imported from evolutionary
theory into economic theory, we need to identify the gen-
eralized formulations of the principle of natural selection
that are applied in economics. I will therefore begin by
defining two kinds of generalization of the principle of
natural selection. I will then examine, first, the evolution-
ary theory of economic change developed by Nelson and
Winter (N&W henceforth), and, second, the use of EGT in
present economic theory, which rely upon different con-
cepts of natural selection.
Generalization of the Principle of Natural Selection
Since 1970, several attempts to generalize the concept of
natural selection have been made. These fall into two
categories (Gayon 2009b): in the first, reproduction and
heredity are a crucial component; in the second, they are
not.
Richard Lewontin (1970) has explored the first possi-
bility. He proposed generalizing Darwin’s natural selection
through a formulation that avoids referring to any partic-
ular level of organization. Natural selection is defined as a
process arising from the existence of populations of entities
that share three properties: phenotypic variation, differen-
tial fitness, and heritability of fitness. In comparison with
traditional ‘‘Darwinian’’ formulations of natural selection,
this formulation is more general in two senses. First, Le-
wontin’s characterization does not involve the Malthusian
dimension of overpopulation: ‘‘The element of competition
between organisms for a resource in short supply is not
integral to the argument’’ (Lewontin 1970, p. 1). Second,
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his formulation does not refer to any particular mechanism
of inheritance, but only to ‘‘a correlation in fitness between
parent and offspring.’’ This correlation can operate
between traits or entities of any sort, at any level of
organization, provided that there is some idea of descent.
Lewontin claims that heritability of fitness applies to
cytoplasmic inheritance, populations, species, and even
culturally transmissible items. Thus, ‘‘the generality of the
principles of natural selection means that any entities in
nature that have variation, reproduction, and heritability
may evolve’’ (p. 1). This attempt to generalize the principle
of natural selection has been widely applied in a number of
domains, both within and outside biology. In biology, it has
been applied to genes, somatic cells (e.g., in development
and cancer), populations, species, monophyletic taxa, and,
even, as suggested by Lewontin himself, biotic communi-
ties. But it has also been applied to artificial life, computer
science, exobiology, and cultural evolution. Any other
attempt to generalize natural selection that would also
admit that the natural selection requires the existence of a
‘‘parent-progeny’’ or ‘‘ancestor–descendant’’ relationship
would fall in this first method of generalization of natural
selection. For instance, Price’s equation shares this prop-
erty. Although Price’s characterization of natural selection
is more formal and abstract, it belongs, I think, to the same
kind of generalization (Price 1972; see Okasha’s 2007
illuminating comments). Karl Pearson’s biometric charac-
terization in his poorly known ‘‘Fundamental theorem in
natural selection’’ might also be mentioned here (Pearson
1886, §10a; see Gayon 1998).
This first generalization of natural selection requires
entities that either reproduce or are replicated. The second
consists in relaxing Lewontin’s conditions of reproduction
and heredity. As far as I know, this proposal was first for-
mulated by ecologists (see, e.g., Van Valen 1991; Blandin
2007), and subsequently by some philosophers (Rosenberg
and Bouchard 2004; Bouchard 2007, 2008). These authors
have asserted that ecosystems or other ecological entities,
e.g., symbiotic individuals, can evolve in spite of their
inability to reproduce as such. Some sort of natural selection
can nevertheless occur on these entities: what is maximized
is the survival and persistence of the entity considered. No
heredity in the traditional sense is required, only persistence
or continuity. For this kind of generalization of natural
selection, neither Maynard Smith’s notion of ‘‘multiplica-
tion’’ (Maynard Smith 1988) nor Szathma´ry and Maynard
Smith’s (1997) notion of ‘‘reproducer,’’ nor even James
Griesemer’s notion of progeneration (a process leading to an
increase of individuals of the same kind) seems a necessary
condition. All these ways of ‘‘deprivileging genes’’ (Grie-
semer 2000a, b) propose to generalize the concepts of rep-
lication and/or reproduction by referring to some sort of
‘‘persistence through successive life-cycles,’’ or ‘‘re-
occurrence,’’ or even just ‘‘return’’ of something. But this is
precisely the point: ecosystems, although they may split, can
also—and do indeed—emerge without one having to refer to
any sort of repetition or re-occurrence; material continuity
with a former entity of the same sort is not a necessary
condition of their existence. The case of symbiotic organ-
isms implying recurrent migration of an organism (e.g., a
bacterium) into another organism (e.g., a squid; Bouchard’s
favorite example) is a bit more complicated: here we do
observe the re-occurrence of something in a system
endowedwith material continuity. I do not want to go further
in this kind of problem here. Enough to say that some
ecologists (and some economists, as we will see shortly)
have endorsed a concept of natural selection exclusively
founded upon differential persistence, without reference to
any kind of replicative or reproductive process.1
The two generalizations of the principle of natural
selection that I have delineated here are incompatible when
taken as the basis for a definition of natural selection. One
cannot simultaneously say that reproduction and heredity
are necessary conditions for natural selection to exist, and
that they are not (this raises difficult theoretical problems
that I will not discuss here). Furthermore, the second
generalization—the ecological concept of natural selec-
tion—is more general than the first, which requires repro-
duction and heritability of some type of entity. My
objective here is to show that these two possible definitions
of natural selection are valuable tools for assessing the
kinds of analogies involved in contemporary evolutionary
approaches to economics, which I turn to now.
‘‘Economic Natural Selection’’: Nelson and Winter’s
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
The origins of N&W’s ‘‘evolutionary theory of economic
change’’ go back to the 1960s, but it was only in 1982 that
these two authors published a book under that title. I base
my discussion here on this book and on a useful article by
Nelson (1994), which makes the analogies between evo-
lution and economics more explicit.2
N&W propose nothing less than an alternative to the
neoclassical theory of microeconomics. Neoclassical theory
claims that economic agents behave as utility-maximizing
rational agents. Other authors before N&W had criticized
1 A rather harsh debate ensued about whether such an ecological
concept of natural selection is useful. Lewontin (1970, 2009), for
instance, has expressed serious doubts: without reproduction and
heritability, there is only a process of differential elimination, not an
indefinite and open process of transformation.
2 Except in the last few years, evolutionary economics has been
neglected by philosophers of biology. See, however, Callebaut
(1983), Rosenberg (1994); Gayon (1999, 2009a).
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the limits of this assumption. As early as 1950, Alchian
underlined that economic agents are in fact often ill
informed, that they act in a context of uncertainty, and that
their actions are quite often non-rational with respect to their
objectives. Consequently, Alchian proposed that economists
take into account two dimensions that they had traditionally
neglected—the cognitive aspect of agents’ decision making,
and the dynamic of their interactions—and not only attempt
to describe the equilibrium they attain. Following Alchian,
some economists began thinking about the possibility of
revising economic theory with the help of concepts imported
from evolutionary biology, especially Darwinian evolu-
tionary biology. Evolutionary theory, they hoped, would
foster the development of an economic theory more open to
the dynamics of interaction among agents, and less depen-
dent upon a strict concept of their rationality.
N&W were a product of this new approach to economic
theory. What distinguished them was the project of offering
a radical alternative to the traditional neoclassical view.
They proposed to rebuild economic theory around the idea
that the behavior of firms is at any given time determined
by a definite number of capacities and rules of decision,
which exhibit a relative continuity within the firm. These
capacities and rules are technological or managerial com-
petences, and recurrent strategies for investment and
research and development. All of them constitute ‘‘rou-
tines,’’ which are the basic unit of economic analysis.
Routines are transmitted within the firm, and they are
gradually modified in time. The ability of firms to adapt
their routines to their environment—rather than their
existence as profit-maximizing agents—is the ultimate
factor in their success or decline.
This point deserves emphasis. For classical theory,
firms’ use of routines at all levels results from their profit-
maximizing strategy. For the evolutionary theory of eco-
nomic change, the order of causation is reversed: routines
endogenously determine firms’ behavior. The idea is that
firms have an ‘‘organizational memory.’’ At any given
time, the current routines determine the subsequent state of
the enterprise—whence the massive use of a Markovian
approach by N&W (1982, p. 19).
Another distinctive trait of N&W’s approach is their
careful analogy between biological natural selection and
what they call ‘‘economic natural selection’’ (ENS). ENS is
not properly a selection of firms (as in previous works), but
a selection of routines, which then determines the survival
or extinction of firms. N&W—and especially Nelson—
have elaborated a careful comparison between ENS and
genetic selection. Economic natural selection requires
taking into account three kinds of entities:
(1) Firms that correspond to individual organisms in
biological evolution.
(2) Routines that correspond to genes: they are ‘‘heritable’’
and ‘‘mutable.’’ Here, however, we should be cautious
about what N&W say: routines are ‘‘heritable’’ in the
sense that a given firmhas an ‘‘organizationalmemory,’’
which the authors conceive of as the partial continuity of
a combination of routines. This is a rather problematic
point in the theory, for two reasons: (a) there is no room
for reproduction; routines are ‘‘transmitted’’ within the
firm; (b) N&W distinguish routines proper (analogs to
genes) and ‘‘coadapted routines’’ (analogs to geno-
types), which constitute as such the ‘‘organizational
memory’’ of the firm (Nelson 1994).
(3) The firms compete within a population of firms
occupying a given ‘‘environment,’’ viz., the market
for a certain kind of product. Consequently, firms
have different fitness values, by which the authors
mean that there are ‘‘patterns of survival and differ-
ential growth among a population of firms.’’ Note
here that N&W speak of the ‘‘growth’’ of firms, not of
the reproduction of anything. Firms survive and
persist; they do not reproduce. Routines also enjoy
survival for as long as they persist, but they are not
replicated either through the ‘‘reproduction’’ of firms
(making a daughter firm or division—vertical inher-
itance) or in the sense of horizontal transfer from firm
to firm (horizontal inheritance).
These analogies being mooted, the evolutionary theory
of economic change consists in saying that there exists a
strong economic analog of natural selection in biology:
routines that are beneficial to the firms are selected within a
population of firms, in a given economic environment. This
is ‘‘economic natural selection.’’
We observe here amajor case of transfer of concepts from
one domain to another. However, we must be precise about
what N&Ware really doing. Reading their book and articles,
it is clear that N&W do not transpose models of selection
from population genetics to economic theory. Their models
are genuinely economic models, inspired by traditional
microeconomicmodels. In fact, as I will show later, these are
models of behavioral learning. Thus, what N&W transfer
from biology is not a set of models, but a set of concepts.
Because my purpose is to evaluate an analogy, I would
like now to point out a difficulty of this theoretical con-
struction. The problem is the absence of any precise eco-
nomic analog of reproduction. While I say that this is a
difficulty, the authors do not see it as such, but rather as an
intrinsic feature of their conception. For them, routines are
not passed on through a process of reproduction of firms. If
routines are ‘‘heritable,’’ they are not inherited via the
reproduction of firms. Firms exhibit varying patterns of
‘‘survival and differential growth,’’ but their fitness is not




For this reason, N&W refuse to consider their economic
theory as a case of cultural evolution. For them the ‘‘her-
itability’’ of routines does not mean that they are passed on
from individual to individual by imitation. In particular,
they do not describe a horizontal transmission of routines
from firm to firm (or, more precisely, they do not consider
such transfer as causally important). Routines are trans-
mitted within the firm. What this means is that techno-
logical and managerial innovation result from complex
forms of organization that characterize the firm as a whole.
The ‘‘heritability’’ of routines therefore boils down to what
the authors call ‘‘organizational memory.’’ We thus have a
case of ‘‘behavioral learning,’’ rather than a case of blind
evolution through the selection of cultural items—routines
(Walliser 2000). This behavioral learning is handled by the
firm itself, which acts as an autonomous collective agent
adjusting the aggregate of ‘‘routines’’ according to its
observable environment (N&W 1982, p. 18). This is the
reason why N&W say that their theory is ultimately as
much ‘‘Lamarckian’’ as it is ‘‘Darwinian’’:
… it is neither difficult nor implausible to develop
models of firm behavior that interweave ‘‘blind’’ and
‘‘deliberate’’ processes…. Our theory is unabashedly
Lamarckian: it contemplates both the ‘‘inheritance’’
of acquired characteristics and the timely appearance
of variation under the stimulus of adversity. (p. 11)
In conclusion, N&W’s notion of economic natural selec-
tion makes sense in view of the second generalization of the
principle of natural selection I defined earlier. In spite of their
insistent reference to the language of population genetics,
N&W’s notion of economic natural selection is not compat-
ible with any definition of natural selection that depends on a
reproductive process of any sort. The theory of economic
natural selection relies rather on an ecological concept of
selection, where the heritability of traits is admitted only
insofar as it refers to the continuity of certain behaviorswithin
a given system (the firm). Routines are not selected as such
among firms: they are adjustable variables within a firm that
tries to improve its adaptation to its own environment
according to what it has learnt by trial and error.
Evolutionary Game Theory and Economics
N&W’s evolutionary theory of economic change represents
an attempt to rebuild microeconomic theory as a whole. I
argue that it relies upon a concept of natural selection that
does not require reproducing entities. I will now consider
another evolutionary approach to economic theory, con-
sistent with the other generalization of natural selection
that I characterized above, which postulates the existence
of self-reproducing entities.
Here I will draw upon a classification of the methods
currently used in economics for describing the interactions
between economic agents, which I borrow from the French
economist Bernard Walliser (1994, 1998). Walliser defines
four different approaches of economic interactions between
economic agents, based upon the cognitive abilities
attributed to these agents.
(1) Eductive approach. This approach postulates that
agents are endowed with strong rationality. Each
agent is able to perfectly simulate the behavior of
other agents and to understand the functioning of the
system as a whole.3 In such a situation, mutual beliefs
converge towards a (Nash) equilibrium. Such agents
are guided by a ‘‘Lewisian hand.’’4
(2) Cognitive learning likewise relies upon the notion of
optimizing agents; but the rationality of these agents
is weakened in that they revise their imperfect beliefs
about their environment according to what they
observe. Their actions result not only from a trial-
and-error process; they also deliberately explore their
context and anticipate events (second-order learning).
Their beliefs are locally rational, and may also lead
conjointly to a Nash equilibrium. Such agents are
guided by a ‘‘Bayesian hand.’’
(3) Behavioral learning. In this case, agents’ behavior
depends directly on the observable environment. What
determines the behaviors are the rewards or failures
they experience. In certain cases this can lead to
optimal actions, which, again, may conjointly result in
a Nash equilibrium. However, the equilibrium attained
is mainly determined by a trial-and-error process.
Agents are guided by a ‘‘Skinnerian hand.’’
(4) Evolutionary approach. In this approach,
agents are pure automata, endowed with a rigid
function of behavior. These agents meet randomly in
pairs and reproduce according to the utilities that they
obtain. Subjected to a process of selection, they are
3 This is why this approach is said to be ‘‘eductive.’’ ‘‘Eductive’’
contrasts with ‘‘adaptive.’’ An eductive approach postulates that
rational agents, following a reasoning process, can deduce that an
equilibrium should occur. The time necessary for a real agent to come
to this conclusion is not taken into account. Adaptive learning
operates in real time..
4 This is an allusion to the philosopher David Lewis (1941–2001). In
his book Convention (1969), Lewis makes use of the notion of
‘‘common knowledge.’’ An example of common knowledge would be
that everyone knows p, and everyone knows that everyone knows
p. Walliser’s expression ‘‘Lewisian hand’’ refers to an equilibrium
guided by the existence of a common knowledge. If economic agents
adjust their behavior through learning, their behavior may converge to
something ‘‘rational’’ in the economist’s sense of the word, as a result
of the ‘‘common knowledge’’ that they come to share.
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guided by a ‘‘Darwinian hand.’’ Utility amounts to
fitness, so that only one homogeneous class of agents
may sometimes survive. When a given class cannot
be invaded by another one …, an evolutionary stable
equilibrium is attained. This equilibrium is close to a
symmetrical Nash equilibrium. (Walliser 1994,
pp. 53–54; my translation)
Walliser’s account would probably be endorsed by a
number of economists today. Let me underline some
striking features of this classification. (1) From the first to
the last approach, we move from a postulate of perfect
knowledge to a total absence of agent’s beliefs. (2) The
four methods rely upon a formal treatment of economics in
terms of game theory: the four strategies may lead to a
Nash equilibrium, or something close to it.5 This means
that a certain number of economic problems can be solved
equally well by any of the four strategies. (3) This classi-
fication assumes a particular interpretation of the word
‘‘evolutionary’’: an evolutionary method is a method
founded upon an application to economics of John May-
nard Smith’s notion of evolutionarily stable strategies. The
kind of Darwinism involved here is certainly not the same
as in N&W’s evolutionary theory of economic change
examined earlier.
Walliser alludes to the incorporation of EGT into eco-
nomics, an important shift in economic theory (on EGT
generally, see Maynard Smith 1982; McKenzie 2009; on
EGT as applied in economic theory, see Binmore and
Samuelson 1991; Lesourne et al. 2002). In this approach, the
parallel between the genetic theory of natural selection and
evolutionary economics is more rigorous than in N&W’s
case. The notion of the gene (or rather of hereditarymaterial)
is transposed under the form of a strategy followed by a class
of actors; these strategies are selected as such, because the
claim is that strategies replicate through imitation. This is a
big difference from N&W’s approach, where the most ele-
mentary level, the ‘‘routine,’’ is absorbed into the upper level
of the ‘‘organizational memory’’ of the firm. Consequently,
the notion of natural selection used here fits well with the
first generalization of natural selection that I defined at the
beginning of this article: a notion of selection applying to
entities ‘‘that have variation, reproduction, and heritability’’
(Lewontin 1970, p. 1).
This explains why those who adhere to this approach
think N&W’s evolutionary economics is not really ‘‘evo-
lutionary.’’ According to Walliser (1994), N&W’s theory is
in reality a version of the ‘‘behavioral learning’’ approach.
It is not ‘‘evolutionary’’ (‘‘Darwinian’’) because it does not
treat economic agents as automata, and does not recognize
a specific level where something is clearly replicated.
Rather, the kind of learning involved in N&W is ‘‘behav-
ioral learning’’ rather than ‘‘cognitive learning,’’ because
N&W’s Markovian perspective relates to their conviction
that economic agents (firms) behave according to imme-
diate successes and failures in their own environment.
Conclusions
(1) The two important examples of evolutionary
approaches to economic theory analyzed here fall into
two categories that fit well with the two ways of
generalizing the principle of natural selection that I
have characterized. N&W’s evolutionary economics
relies on an ecological concept of natural selection in
which reproduction or replication play no crucial role,
and which takes heredity in the loosest sense of the
‘‘organizational memory’’ of the actors. EGT applied
to economics relies on a more orthodox representa-
tion of natural selection, where heredity is taken in
the ordinary sense of traits passed on from one gen-
eration to the next through some process of replica-
tion. EGT fits well with the commonest kind of
generalization of natural selection, implying a strong
concept of ‘‘heredity’’ relying on the reproduction of
one or another kind of entity.
(2) From a strictly economic point of view, the two
approaches correspond to different treatments of the
interactions between economic agents. N&W’s evo-
lutionary theory of economic change is in fact an
example of ‘‘behavioral learning.’’ Only EGT can be
said to be genuinely ‘‘evolutionary.’’ Not only is the
analogy with Darwinian evolutionary theory reason-
ably rigorous from a conceptual point of view; it
relies also on a transposition of population genetics
models into economics.
(3) For all that, one cannot say that the analogy between
economics and evolution is loose in one case, and
perfectly clear in the other case. This depends on
one’s frame of reference. If one takes the genetical
theory of natural selection as a reference frame, then
(in spite of what N&W say) EGT is certainly closer to
a strong analogy than N&W’s scheme. But the
analogy used by economic EGT is not that explicit.
The idea of replication of a strategy through imitation
is understandable, but the mechanisms of selection
are unclear. Especially, it is questionable whether
economic agents are really deprived of all knowledge
and beliefs, and act just as automata moved by a
compulsive strategy. (For a detailed analysis of the
subtle relation between learning and evolution in
economic theory, see Walliser 2011).
5 In simple terms, a group of players is in a Nash equilibrium if each
one is making the best decision that he or she can, taking into account




(4) Another big difference between N&W’s approach and
EGT is their ambition. Whereas N&W intended to
stake out a general alternative to the neoclassical
theory of economics, contemporary economists who
appeal to EGT and selection do not believe that this is
the ultimate framework of economic theory. They
take it as a useful tool for solving certain kinds of
problems, in certain circumstances, and with a clear
awareness of the degree of simplification and ideal-
ization that their models imply. For instance, EGT is
useful for modeling processes of contagion (e.g.,
convergence of a market on a new product). It is also
useful for deep theoretical problems, such as the
evolution of cooperation. But in all cases, the attitude
is pragmatic, a matter of inventing ingenious models,
rather than rebuilding the theoretical framework of
modern economics wholesale.
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